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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
FOR COMMUNITY SERVICE PROBATIONERS

Introduction
Legislation in many states authorizes adult and juvenile courts to sentence
offenders to perform community service as a condition of probation. Generally, such
legislation permits local governments (and in some cases, private agencies) to use
probationers in a variety of public service jobs. Community service probationer
programs have generated questions about the liability of local governments for
injuries caused and suffered by probationers performing work under their
superv1s1on. State legislation governing that liability is generally limited to the
application of tort liability and workman's compensation laws to such offenders. But
42 U.S.C., Section 1983 is another possible avenue of liability. This report will
consider what potential liabilities local governments in Tennessee face when they use
probationers to perform community service.

MTAS MUNICIPAL LAW REPORT NO. 8
Statutory Law Governing Community Service By Probationers In Tennessee

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
FOR COMMUNITY SERVICE PROBATIONERS

Under Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA), Title 41, Chapter '}, defendants eligible
for probation' may be ordered to perform community service as a condition of
probation.2
Probatiol)ers may be assigned to the Tennessee department of
Corrections (TCA 41-9-101 et seq.) or to the county probation department (TCA
41-9-201 et seq.) to perform approved community work projects. In both cases, the
local government is insulated from liability for injuries suffered, or caused by, the
community service probationer while he is performing community service work, if
the local government "exercised due care in the protection and supervision of such
probationer" (TCA 41-9-104 and 41-9-204).3 However, that insulation is no greater
than is already provided local governments under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act.

'
''

Local Government Tort Liability For Injuries Caused By Community Service
Probationers
The Tennessee Tort Liability Act stripped local government of immunity from
tort suits in several areas. Under that Act, local governments are now liable for
injuries arising from the negligent operation of motor vehicles by its employees (TCA
29-20-202);unsafe streets and highways (TCA 29-20-203), dangerous structures (TCA
29-20-204), and the negligent acts or omissions of its employees (except for injuries
arising from the performance of discretionary functions, false arrest and several other
intentional torts, issuance and revocation of permits, inspections of property, judicial
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and administrative prosecutions, employee misrepresentations, riots and other
disorders, and the levy and collection of taxes) (TCA 29-20-205). The Tennessee Tort
Liability Act provides that the Act is the exclusive route for a tort liability suit
against a local government (TCA 29-20-101 et seq).

"

'

The most likely source of local government tort liability for injuries caused by
a community service probationer is the negligent acts or omissions of its employees
But the local government cannot be reached directly through the
(TCA 29-20-205).
conduct of the community service probationer because the latter is not a local
government employee. The definition of "employee" in that Act provides that any
person not an elected or appointed official or a member of a board, agency or
commission, is not an employee of a governmental entity, unless the person meets
all of the following requirements:
o

The governmental entity itself selected the person in question to perform
services;

o

The governmental entity is liable for the payment of compensation for the
performance of such services, and the person receives all of his compensation
directly from the payroll department of the governmental entity;

o

The governmental entity provides the person in question the same benefits as
all other employees of the governmental entity, including retirement benefits and
the eligibility to participate in insurance programs.

o

The person acts under the control and direction of the governmental entity not
only as to the result to be accomplished but as to the means and details by
which the result is accomplished.

o

The person is entitled to the same job protection system and rules, such as civil
service or grievance procedures, as are other persons employed by the
governmental entity (TCA 29-20-107(a)[l]-[3]).

That narrow definition appears to conclusively exclude either adult or juvenile
community service probationers. It would be extremely difficult for anyone claiming
injury at the hands of a community service probationer to show that an employer
employee relationship existed between the local government and the community
service probationer. While local governments apply for the use of probationers to
perform community service, they probably do not "select" them to perform services
within the meaning of the Tennessee Tort Liability Act; the selection is done by the

4

Tennessee Department of Corrections or the county probation department (TCA
1-9-104 and 41-9-204). In fact, as its title implies and its contents make clear, the
Community Service Participation Agreement With Supervising Agency (See Appendix A)
which the local government must sign as a condition to obtaining probationers from
the Department of Corrections to perform community service, imposes extensive
supervisory, but no selection, responsibilities on the local government. There are no
local governments in Tennessee which compensate community service probationers
or provide them with the same benefits and job protection they provide to their
regular employees.
An even further limitation on the definition of an employee for the purposes
of the Tennessee Tort Liability Act permits a local government to use and direct the
labor of community service probationers without the danger of creating an
employer-employee relationship. TCA 29-20-107(b) provides that:
A governmental entity's reservation of the right to approve employment
or terminate employment by any contract, agreement or other means or
such entity's ability to control or direct a person not otherwise in the
regular employ of such entity shall not operate to make a person an
employee of such entity for the purpose of the immunity granted by this
chapter unless such person otherwise qualifies as an employee according
to the provisions of this section.
However, the fact that community service probationers are not employees
within the meaning of the Tennessee Tort Liability Act should not lull local
governments into a false sense of security. Negligent acts and omissions of local
government employees for which local governments are liable under that Act,
undoubtedly include negligent supervision. A person claiming injury at the hands
of a community service probationer could sue the local government on the ground
that the failure of the local government's employees to adequately supervise the
community service probationer was the cause of the injury. That person would be
aided by both TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9, and the Tennessee Department of
Corrections' Community Service Participation Agreement With Supervising Agency. TCA,
Title 41, and Chapter 9, in a left-handed fashion, creates a statutory duty on the part
of local governments to protect and supervise community service probationers. The
Agreement, in clear and unmistakable terms, thrusts the responsibility for their
protection and supervision on the user. The user agrees, among other things, to
accept complete responsibility for "All supervision of every defendant who does work
for my agency through this agreement" (Paragraph 2). In addition, the Agreement
provides that:
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IN

CONSIDERATION, for participating in the Work Project P�o?ram, the
supervising agency accepts full responsibility for the superv1s1on of �II
defendants assigned to the agency. Should the supervising agen:y �es!Te
to be insured against any risk associated with the program, _ 1t is the
supervising agency's responsibility to obtain and pay for such insurance
coverage.

i

:1
Ii
I
I

'

they have against similar claims from members of the general public. In fact, TCA,
Title 41, Chapter 9 gives the community service probationer the advantage of a
statute which points to a duty on the part of the local government to supervise and
protect him from injury.

Other provisions in the Agreement give written notice to local governments t�at
community service probationers can represent supervisory problems. That notice
probably creates a correspondingly high supervisory duty on the part of the local
government (especially Paragraph 10), a duty easy to carelessly breach.
But what about the insulation from liability given to local governments which
use community service probations under TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9? That in�ulation
is triggered only if the local government exercised "due care" in the protection and
supervision of the community service probationer. Under Tennessee tort law due
care and ordinary care are synonymous, and the lack of due· (ordinary) care, under
the circumstances, is negligence.• The same standard for measuring whether the
conduct of local government employees is negligent applies to the Tennessee Tort
Liability Act; therefore, TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9 offers local government� no m�re
insulation against claims of injuries suffered at the hands of commumty service
probationers than they already have under the Tenn�ssee �ort . Liability Act. Any
insulation TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9 appears to create 1s an 1llus1on.
Local government employees using community s�r�i�� probationers have _written
notice of their supervisory and protective respons1b1ht1es �nder TC�'. Title 41,
Chapter 9, and the Community Service Participation Agreement With Sup:rvismg A�ency.
But the Agreement also provides local government employees wntten notice o
something their common experience and good sense should have already told them.
some of the probationers may not be Boy Scouts. Due or ordinary care under those
circumstances probably dictates a higher duty on the part of the local governmen_t's
employees to supervise and protect them than they would generally have with
respect to other classes of persons, including fellow employees.

�

Tort Liability For Injuries To Community Service Probationers

An additional source of duty to protect the community service offender is the
Department of Correction's Community Service Participation Agreement With Supervising
Agency. The previous section demonstrated that a local govern
ment signing that
agreement accepts written responsibility for the supervision of community service
probationers. Some of the provisions of that agreement also impose a responsibility
on the local government to protect them. Everything considered, the agreement is
arguably more concerned with their protection than with injuries they may cause
third parties. The participating agency has the responsibility, among other things, for
"Seeing that all supervisors require defendants to wear safety devices as the situation
may require" (Paragraph 7), and "Seeing that no tasks which would reasonably
endanger the life or safety of the defendant is assigned to any defendant" (Paragraph

8).

The most likely sources of liability under that Act for injuries to community
service probationers are the negligent acts or omissions of the local government's
employees (TCA 29-20-205), and the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the
local government's employees (TCA 29-20-202).
For example, a community service probationer injured by a wrench carelessly
dropped on his foot, or in a traffic accident in a vehicle driven by a local
government employee, could sue the local government under the Tennessee Tort
Liability Act the same as could any other member of the general public.
Under TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9, a local government is not liable for injuries
caused or suffered by a community service probationer as long as it exercises "due
care" in the supervision and protection of the probationer. But as the last section
pointed out, "due care" is the same ordinary negligence standard that applies to the
Tennessee Tort Liability Act. TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9 provides no additional
protection to the local government defending the suit brought by the community
service probationer injured by the dropped wrench or in the traffic accident.

Because community service probationers are not employees, local governments
responsible for their control and supervision could be held liable under the Tennes�ee
Tort Liability Act for injuries probationers suffer in the perform�nce of c�mmumty
service work. There appears to be nothing in that Act which provides local
governments any more protection against claims of injury from such persons than

A community service probationer injured while performing community service
work for a local government enjoys a peculiar advantage over a local government
employee injured in the performance of his job: He may recover under the
Tennessee Tort Liability Act while the local government employee may recover only
under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law. As the next section points out,
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the community service probationer's recovery under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act
may significantly exceed the municipal employee's recovery under the Wor er's
Compensation Act, even for identical injuries. But an advantage the e�ployee enJ YS
under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act is that his own negligence causmg
or contributing to the injury will not bar his recovery. The community service
.
probationer's own negligence causing or contributing to his injury may, m some
circumstances, bar his recovery under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act.

�
?

Workers' Compensation Liability For The Community Service Probationer
Recovery by community service probationers under the Tennessee Workers'
rformance
Compensation Act (TCA 50-6-101 et seq.) for injuries sustained i the
.
of community service work, is apparently foreclosed by that law s defm1tion of an
employee. TCA 50-6-102(2)(a) defines an "employee" for the purpose of worker's
compensation coverage as:

�

I

I

_r:

every person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully
employed, the president, any vice-president, secretary, treasurer, or other
executive officer of a corporate employer without regard to the nature of
the duties of such corporate officials, in the service of an employer, as
employer is defined in subdivision (a)(3), under any contract of hire or
apprenticeship, written or implied ... [Emphasis mine.]

�

�

�
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I
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I

I

?

The key to the above definition is the phrase "under an contract of ire r
apprenticeship, written or implied ..." There is no contract of hire or apprenticeship
1978
in the local government-community service probationer relationship. In
.
opinion, the California Attorney General's Office opined that an adul cr m1�al
defendant who elects to perform community service in exchange for probation m heu
of being jailed or fined, has the status of a "volunteer" for the purposes of
California's Workman's Compensation Law. Community service probationers in
Tennessee probably have the same status. They may not be volunteers in the
traditional sense, but they "volunteer" to perform community service in lieu of other
sentencing alternatives open to them.
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The question of whether a volunteer was an employee for Tennessee Workers'
Compensation Law purposes arose in Hill v. King, 663 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. App. 1983).
In that case a deputy sheriff was killed in the crash of an airplane piloted by the
Robertson County Sheriff while they were transporting a prisoner from West Virginia
to Robertson County. The deputy's survivors sued the sheriff personall , Ro ertson
.
County, and an aviation company on various grounds. However, the issue m this
case was the suit against Robertson County on the alternative grounds that the
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deputy was entitled to compensation under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act, or under
the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law. The deputy's survivors appealed the
trial court's decision that the deputy was an employee of Robertson County within
the meaning of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law. The reason they objected
to the trial court's decision is that, in Tennessee, the Workers' Compensation Law is
the exclusive remedy of an employee against an employer for on-the-job injuries. If
the trial court's ruling stood, the right of his survivors to claim a more generous
recovery under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act would be extinguished.
In discussing the relationship between the deputy and Robertson County, the
Court of Appeals found that:
the deceased sustained a unique relationship with Dan King, Sheriff of
Robertson County. He had been commissioned a deputy sheriff, had
received a pistol and uniform, and was authorized to serve process and
transport prisoners. Each employee of the sheriff was permitted to eat one
meal at the jail during each tour of duty... Deceased occasionally ate at the
jail while on duty. He was paid no salary, could work as much or as
little as he chose, and even when scheduled to work, he was not obliged
to report for duty. He was reimbursed for fuel used and expenses
incurred on official business. He did regularly report to work; and, when
he did, he was subject to orders exactly as other salaried officers were.
That relationship did not make the deputy an employee within the meaning
of the Workers' Compensation Law, held the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The
deputy was, "not for hire;" he had not entered into an "agreement for pay." Absent
the agreement for hire, even if he got occasional benefits as an employee, he did not
give up his rights under the common law or the Tennessee Tort Liability Act. As
to the limited benefits the deputy received, the Court said:
It is possible that a court might stretch the occasional meal to represent
'hire' if the question were whether or not workers' compensation were due
although this is extremely doubtful. However, ... to impute or imply a
waiver of so serious a right as the common law right to recover full
compensation or the statutory right to recover within the limits of the
Governmental Tort Liability Act, there must be such real, palpable and
substantial consideration (hire) as would be expected to induce a
reasonable man to give up such valuable rights. In other words, the law
will not presume that Mr. King sold his birthright for a mess of pottage.
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The "mess of pottage" was the relatively small death benefit payable to the
deputy's survivors under the Workers' Compensation Law compared to the deputy's
"birthright," the benefits payable under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act. While the
task will not be undertaken here, a comparison of the Workers' Compensation Law's
schedule of benefits and the damages recoverable under the Tennessee Tort Liability
Act, will bring to mind a variety of circumstances under which a community service
probationer is eligible for a recovery substantially greater than is a comparably
injured local government employee. The community service offender is no more
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likely than the volunteer deputy sheriff to give up his birthright for a mess of
pottage.
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If the deputy sheriff in Hill was not an employee for Workers' Compensation
purposes, it is unlikely that a "volunteer" community service probationer is an
employee, even if he receives his meals on the job or other minor incidental
employee benefits.
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Even if the argument is accepted that a community service probationer is not
a volunteer, that he was coerced to perform community service, it would still be
difficult for him to claim that he is an employee for workers' compensation purposes.
In the case of Abrams v. Madison County Highway Department, 495 S.W.2d 539 (1973)
the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a prisoner performing compulsory labor for
the county was not an employee within the meaning of the Tennessee Workers'
Compensation Law because his labor was involuntary; he had not bargained for
employment.
In other words, a community service offender is not an employee within the
meaning of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law whether he is or is not a
volunteer. In neither case has he bargained for employment or entered a contract
for hire.

Section 1983 Liability For The Conduct Of Community Service Offenders
While the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act is the exclusive route for
a tort liability suit against a local government under Tennessee law, a person
claiming injury arising from the violation of his civil rights by a local government
may sue that government in federal court under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. Section 1983,
as it is commonly called, provides simply that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
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other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Since 1978, municipalities have been "persons" within the meaning of Section
1983. They have frequently been held liable for the conduct of their employees, and
a few times for the conduct of non-employees under their control, when such
conduct resulted in the deprivation of a third party's civil rights. As far as can be
determined, no local government has been held liable under Section 1983 for the
conduct of a community service probationer, but Section 1983 is broad enough to
include such liability under the right circumstances.
It is not difficult to imagine the right circumstances involving community
service probationers following the case of Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee, 814
F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987). There the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a
county could be held liable under Section 1983 for the murder of a sixteen year old
girl by a jail trusty. The facts in that case reflect incredibly poor judgment on the
part of the sheriff and his deputy in exercising supervision and control over the
trusty. They also illustrate how easy it is for poor judgement to be exercised "under
color of statute," and to become government policy or custom resulting in the
deprivation of constitutional rights for which the local government can be held liable.
The Sheriff of Dickson County, Tennessee accepted custody of Charles Hartman,
a convicted burglar, sent to Dickson County by the Tennessee Department of
Corrections under a Tennessee statute that permits counties to contract with the state
to house nondangerous felons (TCA 41-8-101 et seq.).
However, the Court of
Appeals declared that the sheriff and his deputy "were on notice that Hartman was
dangerous and had assaulted a young woman in the past," and that in the face of
that knowledge,5 they gave him frequent unsupervised use of marked sheriff's
department patrol cars fully equipped with lights and siren. Hartman used the
patrol car to perform official and personal tasks for the sheriff and another deputy,
and personal tasks for himself.
On one occasion Hartman, under orders of the deputy, drove the latter to his
farm several miles from the Dickson County jail. Hartman did not reappear at the
Dickson County Jail until ten hours later. During his absence he roamed the
highways of Dickson, Houston and Montgomery Counties and stopped several
motorists, using the patrol car's blue lights. One of the motorists he stopped was
an unfortunate sixteen year old girl who he kidnapped and murdered. At one point
the Montgomery County Sheriff's office learned that a Dickson County Sheriff's car
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was stopping motorists in Montgomery County and reported that information to the
Dickson .County dispatcher.
The Dickson County dispatcher relayed that information to both the Dickson
County Sheriff and his deputy, but neither treated Hartman as an escape or took
any other action. Even after the murder, the sheriff and his deputy continued the
practice of letting trusties use sheriff's patrol cars until the Dickson County Grand
Jury recommended an end to the practice.
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The Court held that the practice of the sheriff and his deputy of providing
Hartman with a clearly marked sheriff's patrol car was action taken under color of
state law, and that:
the defendant's actions cannot be attributed to simple inattention or
carelessness. Rather, the defendants consciously established a policy of
allowing trusties to have use of official patrol cars with seeming
indifference to consequences. The defendants consciously and voluntarily
failed to respond to the danger presented by Hartman's use of the car to
stop motorists.
Such "reckless indifference to the risk posed by their action" was sufficient to state
a claim of action under Section 1983, said the Court.
Generally, cases in which local governments have been held liable for the
conduct o f their employees and non-employees under their control turn upon the
ability of the courts to find one or more, hiring, screening, training, supervisory and
disciplinary practices so negligently bad, that the negligence rises to the level of
deliberate unconstitutional policy or custom on the part of the local government.
Nishiyama demonstrates that the courts have shown a high degree of ability to find
such practices on the part of local governments.
Both the Tennessee Department of Corrections and the county probation
department have an obligation to screen candidates for community servic w rk,
.
and. to regularly inspect each work project to insure that the probat10ner is bemg
properly used (TCA 41-9-101 and 41-9-201). However, Nishiyama turned in part on
the Court's view that the Sheriff of Dickson County had notice that Hartman was a
dangerous person even though the sheriff only accepted custody of him from the
Tennessee Department of Corrections. That case should warn local governments that,
for purposes of Section 1983 liability, they cannot rely on the screening of
probationers by the Tennessee Department of Corrections or the county probation
department. Local governments may only accept, rather than select, community
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service probationers to perform work projects under TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9, but
the responsibility for determining who they have accepted remains in their hands.
Every local government should independently and carefully screen (and in
appropriate cases reject) every prospective community service probationer. Many
of them will be relatively minor offenders, but others may, like Hartman, be ticking
time bombs.
Local governments that use community service probationers should take
seriously the supervisory requirements the Community Service Participation Agreement
With Supervising Agency imposes on them, including the recordskeeping and reporting
requirements. A poor record in this area will be used against the local government,
both by a person claiming injury by a community service probationer, and by a
community service probationer claiming injury. In either case, poor recordskeeping
may be evidence of inadequate supervision and protection of the community service
probationer.
Some local governments attempt to reduce the liability risks in the community
service probationer program by requiring community service probationers to sign a
waiver of claims before it puts them to work. Generally, by signing such a waiver,
the community service probationer releases the local government from all claims for
injuries or damages the probationer may suffer while performing community service
work. There are two serious problems with such waivers.
First, it is questionable whether an "exculpatory contract" executed by a
community service probationer is enforceable.
Even if the community service
probationer is a volunteer, it is the coercive power of the court to jail or fine the
defendant which leads him to "volunteer" for community service as a condition of
probation. The community service probationer is in a severely unequal bargaining
position respecting his labor. Oddly enough, the same lack of "bargaining for hire"
that defeats any claim that the community service probationer is an employee, may
make such a waiver unenforceable as a matter of public policy. (See Olsen v. Molzen,
558 S.W.2d 429 [Tenn. 1977]).
Even if that barrier is jumped, the left-handed
statutory duty local governments owe under TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9 to use "due
care" in the protection and supervision of community service probationers, might
override any waiver signed by the probationer.
Second, the waiver cannot be made effective against a person suing the local
government under the Tennessee Tort Liability Act or Section 1983 for injury at the
hands of a community service probationer. The best that a waiver could do is waive
the community service probationer's claims against the local government.
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It is obvious that no matter what the .source of potential liability of the local
government in the use of community service probationers, the local government can
minimize the risk of liability by using caution in screening them; assigning them to
jobs in which the potential for injury to them and to others is small; adopting and
enforcing clear, written policies governing the scope and conditions of their labor and
their relations with the public and employees; and closely supervising and protecting
them. The local government should also contact its insurance carrier to determine
the extent of its coverage for injuries caused by and to community service
probationers.

i

"

i

APPENDIX A

I
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION - DIVISION OF PROBATION

COMMUNITY SERVICE PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT WITH SUPERVISING AGENCY

14
!ii.I

It is obvious that no matter what the .source of potential liability of the local
government in the use of community service probationers, the local government can
minimize the risk of liability by using caution in screening them; assigning them to
jobs in which the potential for injury to them and to others is small; adopting and
enforcing clear, written policies governing the scope and conditions of their labor and
their relations with the public and employees; and closely supervising and protecting
them. The local government should also contact its insurance carrier to determine
the extent of its coverage for injuries caused by and to community service
probationers.

i

"

i

APPENDIX A

I
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION - DIVISION OF PROBATION

COMMUNITY SERVICE PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT WITH SUPERVISING AGENCY

14
!ii.I

APPENDIX A

ENDNOTES

BATION
ON - DIVISION OF PRO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTI
TICIPATION
COMMUNITY SERVICE PAR
ISING AGENCY"
AGREEMENT WITH SUPERV

�
�

IN nm
ON TO PARTICD'ATE
TMENT OF CORRECTI
THE DEP
H
WIT
THE
EED
TO
AGR
T
HAS
COS
NCY
ENCY AT NO
THE UNDERSIGNED AGE
BE DONE FOR THE AG
FOR LABOR
GE
THE
HAN
EXC
OF
IN
NS
RAM
TIO
OR REGULA
COMMUNITY SERVICE PROG
THE ORDERS' RULES
TO COMPLY w
.
NCY
RAM
AGE
PROG
THE
THE
BY
E
M
ENCY FRO
AGENCY. ANY FAILUR
RMINATION oF THE AG
ULT IN IMMEDIATE
RES
Y
MA
TION
REC
COR
DEPARTMENT OF
AGREED:
RESSLY UNDERSTOOD AND
THE FOLLOWING IS EXP
.
understand
. .
the Work Project Program
ng agency parhc1pating In
rvisi
supe
the
of
e
tativ
esen
as the repr
I,
1.
that I am responsible for:
2.

agency through this program;
ndant who does work for my
All supervision of every defe

3.

the coordinator;
For all records required by

a daily basis;
nt' s time sheet are kept on
rvisor's log and the defenda
Making sure that the supe
tor;
immediately to the coordina
with defendants are reported
Seeing that injuries incurred
5.
.
m
.
records or showing favoritis
y
an
ymg
"f
s1
a
1
f
r
rviso
supe
.
ing with defendants that any
work
rs
rviso
supe
all
n
N tify"
6.
termination from the program;
ny defendant could result in
to ar
ation may require;
sa£ety d evi· ces as the situ
require defendants to wear
Seeing that all supervisors
7.
to any de£endant;
of the defendant is assigned
y endanger the life or safety
nabl
reaso
ld
wou
ch
whi
s
Seeing that no task
8.
.
es
nt and appropriate duphcat
.
each day to each defenda
of
end
the
at
d
l
ssue
are
ipts
rece
k
wor
iate
ropr
�pp
that
Seeing
9.
t;
are maintained for the defendan
de,
.
Such problems may inclu
ediatel to the coordinator.
are re port d
ts
nd�n
any
defe
of
from
use
or
lems
Seeing that any prob
weapon, (d) possession
10.
es ' (c) poss sion of any
(a) uncooperahvenss, (b) tar d
.
but are not limited to:
,
erous horseplay
.
(e) use of profanity, (f) dang
narcot ics, a1coho! or drugs'
ty
.
cy accepts full res ponsibili
Program the supervising agen
icipating in the Work Proie ct
any
part
nst
for
.
agai
red
ION
RAT
Insu
be
SIDE
to
re
CON
'
IN
-1 desi
rv1s lng agen..v
· ned to the agency . Should the supe
e coverage.
ndants assig
and pay for such insuranc
. .
for the supervision of all defe
in
'
obta
to
ty
1
'b'li
ons1
resp
cy s
agen
ng
rv1s1
supe
the
is
it
ram,
risk associated with the prog
e the authonty
. .
by acknowledges that I hav
of the superv1smg agency' here
lf
beha
in
ing
sign
l,
idua
ement; the agreement
The undersigned indiv
by the terms of this agre
agreement· I agree to abl de
the
f
o
. h th"ts agreement'·
enns
t
e
h
t
to
cy
agen
comply wit
to bind the supervising
if the agency should not
erstand the full consequences
und
I
me;
to
d
aine
expl
ly
has been adequate
a copy of this agreement.
and I acknowledge receiving

1.

Under TCA, Section 40-35-303, a defendant is eligible for probation if the
sentence imposed is eight (8) years or less, with some exceptions for certain
crimes. [1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act]

2.

There is probably no authority under Tennessee law for a municipal court to
"sentence" ordinance violators to community service as a condition of probation,
or, for that matter, even to put municipal ordinance violators on probation.

3.

TCA 41-9-104, which applies to probationers supervised by the Tennessee
Department of Corrections, insulates charitable organizations and governmental
entities authorized to utilize probationer labor under TCA 41-9-102.
TCA
41-9-102(a) authorizes "any charitable organization or governmental entity within
a judicial circuit" to utilize such labor.
That authority, standing alone,
undoubtedly includes municipalities within the judicial circuit.
But TCA
41-9-102(c) also provides that any qualified charitable organization, or "any
agency, branch, department or other entity of municipal, county or state
government" may apply to the project coordinator of the judicial circuit where
the work project is to be performed for probationer labor.

4.

: �:

��

TCA 41-9-204, which applies to probationers supervised by the county probation
department, in similar language insulates charitable organizations, and,
specifically, municipalities, counties and political subdivisions authorized by
TCA 41-9-102 to utilize probationer labor.
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4.

If TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9 creates a statutory duty on the part of local
governments to protect and supervise community service probationers, the
breach of that duty may also constitute negligence per se.
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See Street v. National Broadcasting Company, 512 F.Supp. 398 (E.D.Tenn. 1977).
Also see 19 TENNESSEE JURISPRUDENCE, Negligence, sec. 2.

5.

It is not clear in this case either at the District Court or Court of Appeals level
whether the sheriff and his deputy actually had access to Hartman's records,
which apparently indicated his prior assault upon a woman.
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There is probably no authority under Tennessee law for a municipal court to
"sentence" ordinance violators to community service as a condition of probation,
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Department of Corrections, insulates charitable organizations and governmental
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41-9-102(a) authorizes "any charitable organization or governmental entity within
a judicial circuit" to utilize such labor.
That authority, standing alone,
undoubtedly includes municipalities within the judicial circuit.
But TCA
41-9-102(c) also provides that any qualified charitable organization, or "any
agency, branch, department or other entity of municipal, county or state
government" may apply to the project coordinator of the judicial circuit where
the work project is to be performed for probationer labor.
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TCA 41-9-204, which applies to probationers supervised by the county probation
department, in similar language insulates charitable organizations, and,
specifically, municipalities, counties and political subdivisions authorized by
TCA 41-9-102 to utilize probationer labor.
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If TCA, Title 41, Chapter 9 creates a statutory duty on the part of local
governments to protect and supervise community service probationers, the
breach of that duty may also constitute negligence per se.
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It is not clear in this case either at the District Court or Court of Appeals level
whether the sheriff and his deputy actually had access to Hartman's records,
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